Author Topic: What is a Navy for? - Forward Presence vs. Warfighting  (Read 397 times)

Ruckdog

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What is a Navy for? - Forward Presence vs. Warfighting
« on: December 04, 2021, 04:21:18 pm »
There has been some interesting back and forth in the National Security blog/FB/Twitter world over the course of the past week. It was kicked off by former Secretary of Defense Robert Work's article for the USNI, entitled A Slavish Devotion to Forward Presence Has Nearly Broken the U.S. Navy, where he argues that the high peacetime operational tempo of the US Navy is negatively impacting the service's ability to successfully fight a major war.

In response, CAPT Bryan McGrath, USN(ret) wrote a lengthy rebuttal on his blog, What is a Navy For? that addresses several issues he has with Mr. Worth's arguments.

Both pieces are well worth reading and are very thought provoking. The kernal of the disagreement can be found in this quote from McGrath:

Quote
He takes a relatively common-sense approach that the Navy we have is too small for what we ask of it, and I agree with that view. But he would have us ask less of it, and I would have us build more of it.


Easy E

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Re: What is a Navy for? - Forward Presence vs. Warfighting
« Reply #1 on: December 06, 2021, 11:47:36 am »
My limited knowledge on the subject of Naval strategy is probably 20+ years out of date, but I was always under the assumption that the purpose of a Navy was pretty straight forward.  The ability to control and command the Sea Lines of Communication when and where needed via force projection.  Everything else, was secondary to this primary mission.     

Thanks for pointing this out, and I am glad that these questions are being asked.  I think there are two major elements that neither article really talks about but have a huge impact on the topic of Fleet Size. 

1. The growing Super Power status and aggressive posture of China towards Naval affairs such as in Taiwan and the South China Sea. 

2. The perception of shrinking US power and growing isolationism within US political culture.  This leads to a declining interest in commanding and controlling Sea Lines of Communication.

The biggest hinderance to McGarth's strategy is political, and the primary hinderance to Work's strategy will be institutional.  The fact of the matter is that the US has big priorities to juggle right now, and there is no clear cut political will one direction or the other.   If anything, this political paralysis will impact the discussion more than McGarth or Work's talking points.  I think this quote in McGarth's piece is the core of it....

Quote
Until such time as we retreat from world leadership into something other than where we see ourselves today, we will continue to need a larger Navy doing much of what it is asked to do, but more of it.

There is a not insignificant portion of the electorate on both sides of the political divide that would like to see the US retreat from world leadership which would than allow for and embrace Work's thesis. 

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